




he organization of bank regulation in the United States is somewhat
peculiar. Banks answer to an array of regulators, both federal and
state. To begin with, a bank can choose a national or a state charter.
National banks are regulated by the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC). State banks are regulated by their home states, as well as by a federal
regulator. The Federal Reserve System regulates state-chartered banks that
are Federal Reserve members, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) regulates state, nonmember banks. A bank, by its choice of charter
and Federal Reserve membership, chooses its regulators. There is a sense,
then, inwhichU.S.federalbankregulatorsareincompetitionwitheachother.
HowdoesthiscompetitionaffectbankregulationintheUnitedStates? Onthe
one hand, one might conclude that the need to compete with other agencies
would motivate a regulator to perform its tasks as effectively and efﬁciently
as possible. On the other hand, one might argue that the desire to attract more
clients could drive a regulatory agency to be loose.
Banking is not the only industry in which alternative regulatory agencies
compete with one another. Most other instances, however, involve different
geographic jurisdictions. For instance, to the extent that environmental reg-
ulations vary from state to state, a manufacturer’s decision on plant location
entails a choice among potential regulators. The stringency of such regula-
tions then has the potential to become one tool by which states compete to
attract businesses. One could ask the same question about this competition as
is often asked about the interaction among bank regulators. Does competition
lead to effective or excessively loose environmental control?
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When the effects of the regulated activity, polluting for instance, are
predominantly local, geographic regulatory competition, as in the case of
state-level environmental rules, is analogous to the jurisdictional competition
studiedbyTiebout(1956). Tiebout’sdirectconcernwastheprovisionof“local
public goods” by local governments funded with local taxes in a setting with
a mobile population. His conclusion was that competition in the joint setting
of taxes and levels of public goods and services would lead to efﬁcient levels
of government expenditures. The same logic applies to local regulation of
activities with local effects.
Bank regulation, however, does not have the same geographical limits as
some environmental regulation. While state banks are regulated locally by
state supervisory agencies, all banks have federal regulators. Further, a bank
can change its federal regulator without having to relocate or make any other
signiﬁcant change in its activities. In this environment, does theTiebout logic
of beneﬁcial competition still apply?
This article highlights how the effects of alternative regulatory structures
dependonassumptionsaboutsuchunderlyingfactorsastheregulators’objec-
tives, and the way in which regulators’costs are ﬁnanced. This point can best
be made in the context of a model that captures important elements of bank
and bank regulator activities. Section 2 presents such a model. The model’s
emphasis is on the role of bank examinations in assessing the quality of bank
assets in the presence of deposit insurance. In the context of this model, an
efﬁcient regulatory policy is deﬁned. Possible regulatory outcomes are then
studied under alternative assumptions about regulators’ preferences regard-
ing banking industry performance and the extent to which deposit insurance
and bank examination are integrated activities ﬁnanced under a consolidated
budget constraint. In some cases, regulatory competition leads to efﬁcient
policy choices, while in others competition results in inefﬁcient outcomes.
Notably, when the ﬁnancing of regulation and deposit insurance is not inte-
grated, competition among regulators can impose excessive costs on deposit
insurance.
1. BACKGROUND
In discussions about rivalry among alternative bank regulators, a common
concernisthatregulatorswill“racetothebottom.” Eachregulator,itisargued,
will want to attract as many banks into its constituency as possible. Further,
this incentive to attract “client” banks will outweigh the regulators’interest in
controllingbankrisk-takingincentives. Thisso-called“competitioninlaxity”
will result in excessive costs to the deposit insurance system. The possibility
of a race to the bottom, as discussed by Scott (1977), has partly motivated a
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The notion that competition might result in excessively lax or otherwise
inefﬁcientregulationisnotuniquetobanking. Inthegeneralareaofcorporate
governance and the market for corporate control, it has been argued that states
compete to be corporations’ charter locations by passing laws that inhibit
corporate takeovers. Since incumbent managers make location decisions,
they might be inﬂuenced by laws that protect their incumbency. Karpoff and
Malatesta, for instance (1989), report evidence that supports this hypothesis.
Similar arguments have been made about local environmental controls when
the effects of pollution extend beyond the local area. Local governments and
their constituents enjoy the economic beneﬁts of a manufacturer’s decision to
locate in their area but the environmental cost is shared more widely.
These assertions that regulation results in a “race to the bottom” by eco-
nomicefﬁciencystandardsstandinsharpcontrasttoTiebout’snotionofbene-
ﬁcialcompetition. Thekeydifferenceisseenintheexampleofenvironmental
controls. Tiebout’s result applies when both the costs and the beneﬁts of the
pollution-generating activity accrue to the constituents of the local govern-
mental decision maker. Inefﬁcient regulatory choices are more likely to arise
when the costs spill over between localities.
The clean dichotomy between beneﬁcial and harmful regulatory competi-
tion relies on an additional important assumption involving the governmental
decision makers’ objectives. In the case of environmental regulation, the
assumption is essentially that the local government acts to maximize its con-
stituents’welfare. Other objectives are also possible, however. Stigler (1971)
and Peltzman (1976), and the extensive literature that follows their seminal
work emphasize the political economy of interest groups as a determining
factor in regulatory decisions. Along these lines, one idea that is often voiced
is that of “regulatory capture.” This term expresses the notion that regulatory
actions may be driven more by the interests of the ﬁrms in the regulated in-
dustry than by considerations of general or consumer welfare. In reference to
banking in particular, Kane (1996) has suggested that regulators’self-interest
can shape the outcomes of regulation. But there are alternative assumptions
that one might make about regulators’ objectives. One possibility is that in-
dividuals who have some discretion in choosing regulatory actions might be
motivated by their personal reputations and career concerns. Another possi-
bility, particularly relevant to settings where regulators can compete with one
another, isthatagenciesseektomaximizetheirinﬂuencebyregulatingalarge
portion of the industry.
Clearly, the effects of competition among regulators could depend on
regulators’motivations. In a setting of regulatory capture, competition could
exacerbate the tendency to weigh the interests of the regulated industry above
consumer welfare. If regulators are concerned for their personal reputations,
their behavior and their response to competition would depend further on how
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forreputationmightcausebankregulatorstobeconservative,preventingbanks
fromtakingactionsthatmighthavebadoutcomes. Competitioncouldcounter
this tendency by inducing regulators to loosen their control of risk taking in
order to attract more client banks. While empirical evidence on the behavior
of bank regulators and the effects of regulatory competition is sparse, Rosen
(2001) has recently studied the characteristics and behavior of banks that
switch their federal regulator. He ﬁnds evidence consistent with the idea that
competition can be beneﬁcial, as banks tend to improve their performance
following a switch.
In addition to the underlying motives of regulators, another key factor
affecting the way regulators behave under competition is the means of ﬁnanc-
ing regulatory costs. A regulator that must cover all of its costs out of fees
that it charges to its regulated businesses might behave quite differently from
one that draws on general public funding. This distinction has in fact been
highlighted in some recent discussions about the organization of bank regula-
tion. TheOCC,forinstance, coversitsexpensesfromexaminationfees, while
the FDIC bundles regulation with deposit insurance, paying for both out of
deposit insurance premiums. The OCC has argued (for example, in Hawke,
2002) that this difference can distort banks choices among their alternative
federal regulators.
The following section sets out a model that focuses on the choice of a reg-
ulatory mechanism to control the risk-taking incentives of banks with insured
deposits. Thatbasicmodelprovidesaframeworkthatallowstheconsideration
of a number of alternative assumptions about the organization, ﬁnancing, and
motivation of regulators. An underlying assumption is that regulators have
some discretion in choosing the parameters of their regulatory behavior. In
the model, the key parameter is the frequency of examinations. While the
actual degree of discretion exercised by bank regulators on this dimension is
limited by statute, it is clear that, more generally, regulatory agencies have
discretion over the intensity and informativeness of examinations, variables
that would have the same effect as the simple probability that is chosen in the
model.
2. A MODEL OF BANK REGULATION
A bank will be represented as an agent making an investment decision. The
bank raises funds by issuing fully insured deposits. Depositors, therefore, are
not particularly interesting actors in this model, as they supply funds perfectly
elastically at the risk-free rate-of-return, normalized to zero. A bank raises a
ﬁxed amount of deposits, D, and can place funds into one of two investment
projects,representedas“actions”a0anda1. Eachactionresultsinaprobability
distribution over the set of possible outcomes, R ={ − θ,−1,1,θ}, where
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depositors. Let P(a)denote the vector of probabilities if action a is taken.
The speciﬁcation of P(a 0) and P(a 1) is meant to capture the notion that one
of the actions, a0, results in both higher risk and lower expected return than
the other. A simple speciﬁcation that captures this dominance is P(a 0) =
((1 − p0),0,0,p 0) and P(a 1) = (0,(1 − p1),p1,0), where p0 < 1/2 ≤ p1.
Hence, action a0 represents a negative net-present-value investment, while a1
has an expected return at least as great as the risk-free return.
Given full deposit insurance and the absence of any other regulation or
intervention affecting its choice, the bank will choose the inferior action, a0,
if p0θ>p 1, which will be assumed to be true. The bank’s choice of action
is subject to moral hazard, since the action cannot be observed by an outsider
without cost. Hence, the deposit insurer faces the challenge of ensuring that
thebanktakestheproductiveactiona1. Thefollowinganalysisassumesalarge
number of banks, so that, if action a1 is chosen by all banks, the fraction that
earns positive income is equal to the probability p1(and similarly for action
a0).
The problem facing the deposit insurer here is quite simple if the insurer
can impose ex post, state-contingent payments by the bank. Speciﬁcally,
since the outcome θ is possible only if the risky action is taken, the insurer
could ensure the choice of the preferred action, a1, by “taxing” the outcome
θ sufﬁciently.1 The analysis that follows assumes that such state-contingent
payments are not feasible unless costly actions are taken. For instance, θ it-
self might be a random variable that takes a value of one or higher. Realized
outcomes can be uncovered by the insurer only at a cost. Then, it is likely
that such a tool would be used by the insurer in the event of negative returns
in order to give the appropriate compensation to depositors. With positive re-
turns,however,actualreturnsmightremainunmeasured(byoutsiders)aslong
as the bank makes its payments to depositors (plus an insurance “premium”
that covers the expected costs of measurement for “failed banks”). This ar-
rangement, however, would not solve the moral hazard problem of inducing
the bank to take the preferred action. For any insurance premium π paid by
“solvent” banks (banks with positive returns), if p0θ>p 1, as assumed, then
p0(θ − π )>p 1(1 − π). The left-hand side of this inequality would be the
bank’s net return under a0, while the right-hand side gives the return if a1 is
chosen.
An alternative assumption that prevents the regulator from being able to
force the bank to choose a1 using ex post penalties involves the differential
observability of different outcomes. For instance, one could assume that
losses can be observed without cost but that positive outcomes cannot be
distinguished. This amounts to assuming that it is possible to hide proﬁts but
1 For a discussion of using the regulation of bank capital structure to achieve ex post pay-
ments by banks, see Prescott (2001).24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
nottohideorotherwisefalsifylosses. Mathematically,thisassumption,which
is maintained below, is equivalent to assuming that the cost of monitoring
realized losses is zero.
In addition to the ability to measure outcomes after the fact, suppose that
the insurer has the ability to determine whether the bank has chosen a0 or a1
beforeoutcomesarerealizedandtheabilitytoclosedownabankthatisfound
to have chosen the inferior investment strategy. An examination to determine
the bank’s action choice results in a cost of ca, and an early closure of a bank
results in a loss of l<( 1 − p0)θ − p0θ. The loss l can be thought of as the
resource cost of closing a bank early, and this cost is less than the expected
losses from a bank that has taken action a0.
The regulator’s problem is to choose a probability of examination φ,a
course of action where an examination reveals a0, and a fee π to charge banks
that do not fail.2 Any such combination, (π,φ), will be referred to as a policy.
The assumptions above imply that it will be optimal to close a bank observed
to have chosen a0. Accordingly, an efﬁcient policy can be deﬁned as a φ and
a π that solve the following problem.
max{p1 − (1 − p1) − φca}
s.t. p1(1 − π)≥ (1 − φ)p0(θ − π) (1)
and p1π ≥ φca + (1 − p1) (2)
The objective function here is simply the total net returns from the oper-
ations of the typical bank and the regulator – the bank’s expected net income
minus the regulator’s examination costs. Payments from deposit insurance,
payments to depositors, and fee payments from the bank to the regulator are
simply transfer payments. Hence, the objective function represents the regu-
latedbankingindustry’snetcontributiontosocialwelfare. Theﬁrstconstraint
is an incentive compatibility constraint, stating that it must be in the bank’s
interest to choose the productive action a1. The left-hand side shows the ex-
pected return to the bank if it chooses a1, while the right-hand side shows the
expected return from a0. In both cases, the bank only earns a positive return,
out of which it pays the tax π, if it produces positive income. The right-hand
side is weighted by 1−φ, the probability of not being monitored. If the bank
is monitored and discovered to have taken action a0, the regulator closes the
bank, and the bank earns nothing. The second constraint is a consolidated
budget constraint for bank examination and insurance, stating that fees col-
lected from solvent banks must cover the examination costs and the costs of
deposit insurance payouts.
The choice of an efﬁcient arrangement is quite simple. Note ﬁrst that
the objective is equivalent to minimizing examination costs, and therefore
2 In principle, one could allow for two distinct fees, depending on whether a surviving bank
has or has not been examined. In the analysis below, it is assumed that the regulator must charge
a single, nondiscriminating fee to all surviving banks.J.A. Weinberg: CompetitionAmong Bank Regulators 25
Figure 1 The Efﬁcient Policy
Notes: π is the fee charged to successful banks.
φ is the probability that a bank is examined.
To satisfy the budget constraint, a policy (π,φ) must lie below B. To satisfy the incen-
tive constraint, a policy must lie above IC. Consequently, the shaded area is the set of
feasible, self-ﬁnancing policies. The efﬁcient investment choice a1can be achieved at the
lowest resource cost (examination cost) at the efﬁcient policy (π∗,φ∗).
the examination probability φ, subject to the two constraints. Second, the
constraints can be represented by Figure 1 in which the incentive constraint
is represented by the curve IC and the budget constraint by the line B.3 On
B, which is linear in π and φ, the value of π when φ is zero is (1 − p1)/p1.
Also along B, when φ = 1, π = (ca +1−p1)/p1. The shape of the incentive
constraint can be seen by rewriting it as




The right-hand side of this inequality is increasing and convex in π. The
intercept of ICon the φ-axis is 1−p1/p0θ, which is greater than zero. Note
also that IC goes through the point (1,1), so that IC and B cross at a point
3 The ﬁgure incorporates the additional assumption that ca < 2p1 − 1. This assumption says
that examination costs are less than the average net income under action a1, and it is a sufﬁcient
condition for a nonempty constraint set. This assumption also ensures that the maximum value of
the objective function in the efﬁcient regulation problem is positive. That is, a regulated banking
industry yields positive social surplus.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where both φ and π are less than one. Incentive compatibility requires that a
policy (π,φ) lie above IC, while the budget constraint requires that a policy
lie below B. The (π,φ) pairs that satisfy both constraints (that is, the pairs in
the constraint set) are those that lie between IC and B. The efﬁcient policy,
which has the lowest φ in the constraint set, is denoted (π∗,φ∗), where π∗ is
found from the consolidated budget constraint at equality, given φ∗.
The efﬁcient policy varies with the model’s parameters largely in the way
thatonewouldsuspect. Forinstance, aworseningoftheincentiveproblem, as
wouldberepresentedbyanincreaseinθ,leadstoanincreaseinφ∗ tomaintain
incentive compatibility. To cover the increase in examination costs, π∗ must
increase as well. However, one such comparative statics result might seem
unexpected. Speciﬁcally,anincreaseinca,thecostofanexamination,leadsto
an increase in φ∗, the frequency of examinations. This counterintuitive result
arises from the interaction of the budget and incentive constraints. First, the
rising costs need to be met with an increase in the regulator’s revenue by
increasing π. Next, note that an increase in π causes both the right- and left-
hand sides of the incentive constraint to fall. The left-hand side falls faster,
however, meaning that the bank may now ﬁnd it advantageous to take the
high-risk, low-return action a0. To counter this adverse incentive effect, it is
necessary to increase the examination frequency.
3. BEHAVIOR OFA SINGLE REGULATOR WITHA
CONSOLIDATED BUDGET CONSTRAINT
Suppose that a single government entity provides deposit insurance and per-
forms bank examinations. This agency chooses a policy (π,φ) subject to the
incentive and budget constraints in the problem above. Hence, the regulator
knows that if it chooses a policy that does not satisfy the incentive constraint,
banks will choose the high-risk, low-return investment, a0. Under this in-
vestment choice, however, the regulator will ﬁnd it impossible to balance its
budget. A balanced budget is impossible because p0θ − (1 − p0)θ < 0, and
the most the regulator can charge banks that have positive returns is θ. Hence,
the necessity of meeting the budget constraint assures that the regulator will
enforce the efﬁcient action, independent of the regulator’s objective. A regu-
latorthatwaswillingandabletogenerateabudgetdeﬁcitandwhosebehavior
was described by the regulatory capture hypothesis might tolerate action a0.
This action maximizes the banks’beneﬁts from deposit insurance and limited
liability.
While a regulator facing the consolidated budget constraint will always
enforce the efﬁcient action, that regulator will not always choose the efﬁcient
policy(π∗,φ∗). Thischoicedependsontheregulator’sobjectives. Aregulator
that wants to minimize costs will choose (π∗,φ∗). There may be reasons,
however, why a self-interested regulator would not seek to minimize costs.J.A. Weinberg: CompetitionAmong Bank Regulators 27
Another of the regulator’s objectives could involve their attitude toward
bank failures. For example, a “conservative” regulator could be characterized
as one who is particularly averse to bank failures that are seen after the fact
to have been the result of excessive risk taking. That is, regulators may seek
to avoid the eventual revelation that failed banks under their authority took
action a0. One way to achieve this goal would be for regulators to choose
policies that ensure that no banks choose a0. In the basic model, with homo-
geneousbanks, suchregulatorswillchoosetheefﬁcientpolicy. Thefollowing
subsection presents an extension of the model with heterogeneous banks in
which a conservative regulator could choose too restrictive of a policy.
An Extension Involving Multiple Bank Types
Suppose that there are two types of banks, differentiated only by their high-
risk lending opportunities. A fraction λ of the banks will earn returns of θ
(with probability p0)o r−θ (with probability 1−p0) if they take action a0,a s
above. Fortheremainingbanks, a0 yieldsθ (withprobabilityp0)or−θ  (with
probability1−p0),whereθ  >θ. Thebankswithθ  are“highrisk,”andthose
with θ are “low risk.” If these two types of banks were regulated separately,
with a separate (π,φ) for each, then the high-risk banks would have both a
higher fee (π) and a higher frequency of examination (φ). Figure 2 shows the
separate incentive constraints for the two types—IC for the low-risk banks
and IC  for the high-risk. It takes more frequent examination, and therefore
higher fees, to induce the high-risk bank to take the efﬁcient action (a1). As
long as both types are taking the efﬁcient action, then the budget constraint
(B) is the same for both types. In this case, the efﬁcient policies with separate
treatment for the two types would be at the intersection of B and IC for the
low-risk banks and at the intersection of B and IC , the point labeled (π ,φ ),
for the high-risk banks.
It may not be possible for the regulator to distinguish between the two
types of banks. That is, the regulator may have to set a single policy (π,φ)
thatappliestoallbanks. Inthiscase, thepolicy(π ,φ )istheleast-costpolicy
that insures that all banks take action a1. However, this might not be the
most efﬁcient policy. In particular, if λ is close to 1, so that high-risk banks
represent only a small fraction of the population, a policy that prevents only
the low-risk banks from taking the high-risk action may be preferable. The
best such policy is one that just satisﬁes the incentive constraint for the low-
risk banks, allows high-risk banks to take action a0, and satisﬁes the budget
constraint,
[λp1 + (1 − λ)(1 − φ)p0]π (3)
≥ λ(1 − p1) + (1 − λ)(1 − φ)(1 − p0)θ  + (1 − λ)φl + φca.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: The budget constraint if all banks take action a1 is represented by B. If high-risk
banks take a0, while low-risk banks take a1, then the budget constraint is given by A.
The incentive constraints are IC for the low-risk banks and IC  for high-risk banks. The
best conservative policy (that induces all banks to choose a1)i s( π ,φ ). But there are
relatively few high-risk banks, then the policy (  π,  φ) is efﬁcient.
This budget constraint is represented by A in Figure 2, and the policy at the
intersection of A and IC is denoted (  π,  φ). When λ is large, A lies very
close to B, as in the ﬁgure. Compared to (π ,φ ), (  π,  φ) involves increased
costs associated with the failures and early closures of high-risk banks but a
cost savings associated with the reduced examination frequency for all banks.
When λ is large enough, the savings will outweigh the costs, making (  π,  φ)
the efﬁcient policy.
In this extension of the model, the chosen policy may depend on the regu-
lator’s preferences and objective. As always, a welfare-maximizing regulator
will choose the efﬁcient policy. Suppose, however, that the regulator has the
conservative preferences outlined above. That is, the regulator is particularly
concerned with preventing bank failures that are found after the fact to have
been caused by “excessive” risk taking. This concern might arise, for in-
stance, because the regulator is sensitive to how such failures will affect his
or her reputation, either with the legislature or with the public at large. Such
a conservative regulator might well choose the policy (π ,φ ), even when theJ.A. Weinberg: CompetitionAmong Bank Regulators 29
efﬁcient policy is (  π,  φ).4 This, then, is a case where competitive pressure
among alternative regulators might be particularly beneﬁcial.
4. COMPETITION BETWEEN TWO COMBINED INSURANCE
AND REGULATIONAGENCIES
As seen above, the interaction between the incentive and insurance-regulation
budget constraints is the key to determining desirable policies. As an initial
stepinexamining“competition”amongregulators, considerthecaseinwhich
each regulator also has deposit insurance responsibilities for the banks that it
regulates. That is, each regulator has its own consolidated budget constraint.
The interaction between the regulators is then described as a game in which
each regulator chooses a policy, and banks respond by choosing between the
regulators. Assume that if the regulators choose identical policies, banks
divide evenly between the regulators.
To complete the speciﬁcation of the game requires a speciﬁcation of how
the regulators’payoffs respond to the policy choices. These payoff functions
wouldreﬂecttheregulators’objectives,whichmightincludesuchgoalsascost
minimization, orminimizationofrisktakingbybanks(preventingbanksfrom
choosing a0). In a setting with competing regulators, it is likely that whatever
other criteria the regulators are considering, they also care about their share of
the regulated industry. This objective might, for instance, arise out of a desire
by the regulator to maximize its inﬂuence on the industry.
In the previous subsection’s extension of the basic model, suppose there
are two regulators that care about two things. First, as discussed above, they
are conservative, with a dislike for failures or early closures associated with
banks taking the action a0. Second, each has a preference for regulating as
large a share of the industry as possible. One could put more structure on
these preferences by, for instance, specifying a function by which the regula-
tors evaluate different possible outcomes. Even without such added structure,
however, it is possible to examine the nature of the interaction between reg-
ulators’ policy choices. An equilibrium (Nash equilibrium) of the game is a
pair of policy choices, one by each regulator, such that neither can do better
by changing policy, given the policy of the other.
Notice ﬁrst that given the nature of the game, and assuming the regulators
havethesamepreferences, equilibriummustinvolvebothregulatorschoosing
4A caveat is in order regarding the speciﬁcation of “efﬁciency” when the regulator has a
preference, whether personal or political, for preventing all banks from choosing a0. Strictly speak-
ing, the social welfare function would be the industry’s net income minus examination costs minus
any utility cost to the regulator that results if some banks choose a0. The latter is assumed to
be small relative to banks’ income and examination costs. That is, while such a utility cost, even
when small, can affect a regulator’s choice of policy, it is assumed that the cost is small enough
that it does not affect the determination of an efﬁcient policy.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the same policy. If they have different policies and all banks prefer one of
the policies, then the regulator with the less preferred policy will certainly
prefer to mimic the other and share the industry.5 Two likely candidates for
equilibrium policies are the “conservative” policy (π ,φ ) from Figure 2 and
the efﬁcient policy (  π,  φ). Recall that the latter policy is efﬁcient under the
assumption that λ, the relative number of low-risk banks, is large enough.
Can (π ,φ ) be an equilibrium policy? Suppose one regulator has chosen
this policy and consider the other’s optimal response. In particular, consider
the second regulator’s choice between (π ,φ ) and (π  ,φ  ) in Figure 2. All
banks will prefer (π  ,φ  ); low-risk banks prefer it for its lower fee, and high-
risk banks also enjoy the potential gains from taking the high-risk action.
Note that this policy is also feasible, since it satisﬁes the consolidated budget
constraint(A)thatholdswhenhigh-riskbankschoosea0. Giventhatitscoun-
terpart has chosen (π ,φ ), a regulator will choose (π  ,φ  ) if the perceived
beneﬁt of regulating more banks is greater than the perceived cost of allowing
a small number of high-risk banks to take action a0. Suppose the weights that
the regulator places on these criteria are such that (π  ,φ  ) is the preferred
of the two policies. Then (π ,φ ) is not an equilibrium policy. Neither, of
course, is (π  ,φ  ), since a rival can attract all banks away with a policy along
A with a lower π and a lower φ. In this case, bidding by regulators results in
anequilibriumpolicyof(  π,  φ). Incontrast,theabsenceofcompetitionresults
in the conservative policy of (π ,φ ); a sole conservative regulator need not
compete for clients and can instead focus only on making sure that no banks
have an incentive to take a0.
The discussion in this section implicitly involves a regulators’ objective
function that exhibits a trade-off between a taste for regulating as large a
share of the industry as possible and a distaste for “excessive” risk taking by
banks. Theprecedingparagraphdescribesasituationinwhichtheformer(the
desire to increase “turf”) is strong enough that it eliminates the conservative
policy (π ,φ ) as a potential equilibrium outcome. Indeed, this is a case in
whichregulators’interestinincreasingtheirturfservesausefulsocialpurpose.
Of course, it is possible for the other component of regulators’ preferences,
their desire to limit risk taking, to be strong enough to support (π ,φ )a sa n
equilibrium policy. The following example illustrates these points, by taking
the assumptions of this section and adding an explicit regulatory objective
function.
5 It is also possible for the regulators to have different policies and for each type of bank
to prefer a different one of the policies. This could only happen, however, if at least one of
the policies is not incentive compatible for at least one of the types, since the two bank types’
preferences among incentive compatible policies (policies that induce the action a1) are identical.
A regulator that attracts only high-risk banks with a policy that induces action a0 cannot satisfy its
consolidated budget constraint. Therefore, such a mix of strategies is not an equilibrium outcome.J.A. Weinberg: CompetitionAmong Bank Regulators 31
Example 1 Label the regulators 1 and 2, and let regulator i’s preferences be
represented by
αFi − βDi
whereF i isthefractionoftheindustrythati regulates,andDi isthefractionof
the banks regulated by i that take action a0. The parameters α and β measure
thestrengthoftheregulators’preferencesforthetwoobjectives. Nowconsider
regulator 2’s choice of policy if regulator 1 has chosen (π ,φ ). In particular,
considerregulator2’schoicebetween(π ,φ )andapolicyalongAwithlower
π and φ than at (π ,φ ). The point (π  ,φ  ) gives one such policy. If (π ,φ )
ispreferred, thenthatistheequilibriumpolicy. Ifregulator2chooses(π ,φ ),
then the industry is evenly divided between the regulators, and no banks will
choose a0. That is, F 2 = 1/2 and D2 = 0. On the other hand, regulator 2
can capture the entire industry by choosing (π  ,φ  ) at the cost of inducing
high-risk banks to take action a0. In this case, F 2 = 1, and D2 = (1 − λ).
Regulator 2 will prefer (π ,φ ) over (π  ,φ  )i fα/2 ≥ α −β(1−λ), that is if
α/β ≤ 2(1−λ). As suggested above, if the relative distaste for risk taking is
strongenough(ifβ issmallenoughrelativetoα), thentheconservativepolicy
(π ,φ ) can be an equilibrium. On the other hand, for any given preference
speciﬁcation, if the population of high-risk banks is small enough (λ is big
enough), then (π ,φ ) will not be an equilibrium. When this is the case, then
the efﬁcient policy (  π,  φ) is the equilibrium.
The efﬁcient outcome that arises from regulatory competition is similar
to the outcome that would arise in this environment if, instead of being deter-
minedbyregulators,π andφ weresetbyprivateprovidersofdepositinsurance
with the ability to monitor and shut down banks under certain circumstances.
A monopolist private insurer in this setting would pick high fees and a high
probability of monitoring. In fact a monopolist’s proﬁt-maximizing decision,
at least under some auxiliary assumptions, is to choose π = φ = 1. Compe-
tition, on the other hand, would cause rival insurers to bid their insurance and
monitoring offers down to the efﬁcient policy.
One key to the efﬁciency result in this section is the consolidated budget
constraintstheregulatorsface. Thatis,eachregulatorisbothaninsurerandan
examiner of its banks, and neither can draw on other sources of funds to cover
any of its costs. With this assumption, the so-called “race-to-the-bottom”
characteristic, by which regulatory competition leads to too little regulation
(too little monitoring) cannot be an equilibrium result. From the status quo of
(  π,  φ)withregulatorssplittingtheindustry,theonlywayaregulatorcanattract
more banks is by offering a policy that induces all banks to choose the high-
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This is true by the basic assumptions of the model.6 If all banks choose
investments with negative expected value, there are not enough resources in
successful banks to cover all the costs of insurance, let alone examination
costs. Hence, a race to the bottom will not occur. When a regulator is both
an examiner and an insurer of banks, the regulator internalizes the effects of
examination policy on the deposit insurance fund.
Of course in the United States, the multiple federal bank regulatory agen-
cies do not each face their own consolidated budget constraints. Instead, the
FDIC provides deposit insurance to all banks. It ﬁnances this insurance with
premiums charged to insured institutions (or more generally, by the mainte-
nance of a fund built up by banks’ premium payments). The FDIC ﬁnances
its regulatory and supervisory costs out of the same revenue source as its in-
surance. At the same time, the FDIC’s ﬁnancial resources are supplemented
by the full faith and credit of the federal government. The Federal Reserve
pays for its regulatory activities out of its general revenue from central bank
operations. The OCC covers its costs out of a fee charged to the banks it
regulates. The next section considers how these differences complicate the
interaction among regulators.
5. UNCONSOLIDATED BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
When the ﬁnancing of deposit insurance and bank regulation are not consol-
idated, there is a possibility that competition among regulators will lead to
undesirable results. The simplest way of examining this possibility is to as-
sume that deposit insurance is ﬁnanced out of general government revenues,
while regulatory agencies cover their examination costs, and the costs associ-
ated with the early closure of banks, from the fees they charge. In this case, a
regulator’s budget constraint, assuming incentive compatibility, is
p1π ≥ φca.
For a policy such that the incentive constraint is not satisﬁed, the budget
constraint is
p0π ≥ φ(ca + l),
where l is the resource cost of closing a bank that is examined and found to
have taken action a0. These two constraints are shown in Figure 3 as Bu and
Au respectively.
6 The key assumption here is that a0 represents an investment with a negative net present
value. However, if a0 were a positive net-present-value investment but dominated by a1, the
efﬁcient policy result would still hold. With all banks taking a0, π would have to be large in
order to satisfy the consolidated budget constraint, making it impossible to choose a (π,φ) that
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Figure 3 Unconsolidated Budget Constraints
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the budget constraints for a regulator that only covers exam-
ination costs out of fees charged. If all banks take action a1 the budget constraint is
Bu. If high-risk banks take a0 while low-risk banks take a1, then the budget constraint
is given by Au. The incentive constraint is IC. If regulators’ distaste for risk taking
by banks outweighs their desire to attract client banks, then the equilibrium policy is
(π1,φ1). If regulators desire to compete for clients is stronger, then the policy (π1,φ2)
will bid clients away from a regulator offering (π1,φ1).
This section considers the simplest case of a single type of bank (a single
θ-type) and regulators whose objective is narrow and parochial. That is, each
regulator simply seeks to maximize its turf, or the share of the market it
regulates. Recall that under these assumptions, when regulators also faced
consolidated budget constraints, competition led to efﬁcient policies. Here
that is not the case. Note that the efﬁcient policy (π∗,φ∗) from Figure 1,
because it satisﬁes the consolidated budget constraint, yields surplus funding
to a regulator that only needs to cover examination costs. That is,
p1π∗ = φ∗ca + (1 − p1)>φ ∗ca.
Now consider the policy (π1,φ1). This is the lowest cost policy that induces
banks to choose a1 and covers examination costs. This policy cannot be an
equilibrium when regulators care only about the size of their turf. The policy
(π1,φ2) will be strictly preferred by all banks, because it allows them the
opportunity to gamble for the large return, θ. Among policies that induce
banks to choose a0, however, regulators will continue to bid for banks by
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andbudgetconstraintsthereisatendencyfortheregulatoryprocesstounravel
altogether, resulting in an equilibrium with no examination (φ = 0) and no
fee charged to banks by regulators (π = 0). In the absence of any external
constraint on regulators’discretion, the agencies have no incentive to engage
in more than minimal regulatory activities. This case, then, represents the
so-called “race to the bottom.”
Now suppose that conservativeness, as speciﬁed in earlier sections, is
also a part of the regulators’objectives. The previous subsection argued that a
regulator with such a mix of motives might be willing to loosen regulation in
a way that induces only a small number of banks to take action a0. With only
a single type of bank, however, a regulator is less likely to choose a policy that
causes all banks to take a0, even if doing so attracts many more banks to that
regulator. This logic leads to an equilibrium policy of (π1,φ1), assuming that
there is no separate fee assessment for deposit insurance. While this policy
preservesbanks’incentivestotaketheefﬁcientaction,itrequiresanetsubsidy
to the combined activities of insurance and regulation.
With consolidated budget constraints, regulators directly internalize the
effect of regulatory actions on deposit insurance exposure. This automatic
connection is lost when regulation and insurance are separately funded. This
separation creates a sort of artiﬁcial externality that has an effect similar to
the externalities that can interfere with the Tiebout result of efﬁcient policies
under competition among local governments.
6. SUMMARYAND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The preceding sections presented a model in which the key function of bank
regulation is the monitoring of the investment choices made by insured banks.
Themodelpredictspolicychoicesbyregulatorsthatdependonthestructureof
the banking industry (captured by the distribution of bank types), regulators’
objectives, and the ﬁnancing of bank regulation and deposit insurance (cap-
tured by the regulators’budget constraints). The key ﬁndings of the analysis
are: 1) a single regulator facing a consolidated budget constraint and a homo-
geneous banking industry will typically choose an efﬁcient policy; 2) if there
are multiple bank types with a small number of particularly high-risk banks,
a single regulator with conservative preferences toward bank risk taking may
choose an excessively strict policy; 3) with consolidated budget constraints
forallregulators, competitionfor“turf”amongmultipleregulatorscanleadto
efﬁcient policies; and 4) competition for turf among regulators whose budget
constraints only cover examination costs (and not insurance costs) leads to a
“race to the bottom.”
Theprevioussection’ssimplespeciﬁcationofunconsolidatedbudgetcon-
straints still does not match the actual organization and ﬁnancing of bank de-
posit insurance and regulation in the United States. Most notably, one of theJ.A. Weinberg: CompetitionAmong Bank Regulators 35
agencies—the FDIC—ﬁnances both insurance for all banks and regulation
for its banks out of the “fees” it charges to all banks. Further, by choosing
to be regulated by the OCC or the Fed, however, a bank does not reduce the
fees that it pays to the FDIC for insurance. Accordingly, the way in which
fees enter into banks’choices of regulators is more complicated in reality than
in this article’s model. Still, since the ﬁnancing of insurance and regulation
is separated for all other banks other than those regulated by the FDIC, the
budgetary externality discussed in this article is present.
Manyothercharacteristicsofactualbankregulationhavealsobeenleftout
of the analysis. Rather than presenting a richly detailed description of actual
regulatory institutions, this article’s intent was to present a simple analytical
framework for thinking about the interaction among alternative regulators.
In spite of the inherent over simpliﬁcation, the basic results of this article’s
analysis are likely to carry over to more complex environments. Competitive
interaction among regulators can have beneﬁcial effects, but the separation of
the ﬁnancing of insurance and regulation can make those beneﬁts less certain.
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